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Lunes 22 de agosto

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Keynote speaker #1 Diana Pérez

UBA IIF - SADF -
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Conferencia Magistral Maite Ezcurdia: Acerca del carácter básico de algunos procesos emocionales y sus implicancias

La vida afectiva ha quedado al margen de las reflexiones en la filosofía de la mente de los últimos 50 años. Sin embargo, las emociones -en particular- han sido objeto creciente de estudio empírico, desde la biología, la psicología y las neurociencias afectivas. En este trabajo me propongo discutir la cuestión del carácter básico o primitivo de ciertas emociones. Para ello presentaré en detalle diversos aspectos constitutivos de ciertos fenómenos emocionales que suelen ser considerados básicos. En segundo lugar consideraré diversos sentidos en los que estos fenómenos pueden ser considerados básicos. Propondré un sentido diferente, en el que no sólo se entienden como básicos ciertos fenómenos emocionales, sino también resultan básicas ciertas formas de conceptualizar nuestra vida afectiva, quedando los conceptos psicológicos entre los primeros en ser adquiridos en el desarrollo ontogenético. Finalmente, esbozaré algunas de las implicancias que se siguen para la filosofía de la mente.

Martes 23 de agosto

Martes 23 de agosto



Daian Flórez 
Universidad Nacional
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Inconmensurabilidad perceptual y penetrabilidad cognitiva

En la primera formulación de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad (1962/1996), Kuhn defiende una suerte de “inconmensurabilidad perceptual”, que podría formularse como sigue: los defensores de las teorías T1 y T2 tienen percepciones inconmensurables en la forma en la que ven los objetos, quien suscribe T1 y quien suscribe T2, es radicalmente diferente. A partir de esta tesis, Kuhn cuestiona la idea de que los enunciados observacionales sean la expresión de contenidos de conocimiento básico, neutral y objetivo, con base en el cual se pueden comparar punto por punto dos teorías rivales. Con los cambios revolucionarios de teorías tienen lugar variaciones notables de percepción entre los sujetos que defienden paradigmas rivales. Estos cambios de visión dependen de variaciones en las creencias teóricas entre los científicos. De tal suerte que el cambio conceptual implica un cambio perceptual y visual. Dicho cambio se explica, según Kuhn, porque la experiencia perceptual se da gracias a un vínculo estrecho entre conceptos de una parte, y la percepción de la otra. Para defender este punto de vista, Kuhn apela a episodios de la historia de la ciencia tales como las diferencias visuales entre Priestley y Lavoisier, cuando realizaron en sus laboratorios el célebre experimento con la cal de mercurio. El experimento consistía en calentar el óxido de mercurio en un recipiente cerrado hasta que se descomponía. El resultado era la obtención de mercurio y de un gas. Este fue identificado por Priestley como “aire deflogistizado”, mientras que Lavoisier lo identificó como “oxígeno”. Esta tesis filosófica parece inspirar, una hipótesis empírica, formulada en el dominio de las ciencias cognitivas por Zenon Pylyshyn (1980): la hipótesis de la penetración cognitiva. A pesar de la evidencia a su favor, esta hipótesis ha recibido duros ataques en el terreno de la filosofía. Justamente por ello, en este ensayo voy a evaluar críticamente tres de las objeciones -que contempla Stokes (2013)- en su contra, y que se pueden agrupar bajo la etiqueta de “las consecuencias epistémicas perniciosas” de la hipótesis. Como la hipótesis de la penetración cognitiva (en lo que sigue HPC) evoca la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad perceptual, podríamos pensar prima facie que la evidencia empírica disponible a su favor, puede servir al propósito de mostrar la plausibilidad empírica de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad perceptual.

Sin embargo, aquí voy a adoptar una maniobra argumentativa inversa, i.e., me propongo defender la HPC con base en una línea argumentativa muy perspicua que ha servido para apoyar la plausibilidad empírica de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad perceptual (en conjunción con la tesis de la carga teórica de las observaciones), a saber, recurriré al experimento mental - defendido por Kuhn en 1962- en el cual plantea un encuentro imaginario entre Aristóteles y Galileo, que nos permite suponer que estados mentales como las creencias sí penetran cognitivamente las percepciones.

Martes 23 de agosto

Pablo Melogno 
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Cambio de término y cambio de significado. Una nomenclatura posible

Desde la formulación de la tesis de inconmensurabilidad por Kuhn (1962), los problemas del significado de los términos científicos han ocupado un lugar central en la consideración del cambio teórico. Shapere (1964), Scheffler (1967) y Devitt (1979) señalaron distintos niveles de confusión entre cambio de significado y cambio de referencia, dados por la asunción en Kuhn de una concepción descriptivista del significado.

El desarrollo de la teoría causal de la referencia por Kripke (1971) y Putnam (1975) ofreció una alternativa a las semánticas descriptivistas, proporcionando una explicación de las relaciones entre cambio de significado y cambio de referencia. Kitcher (1978) retomó esta orientación mediante el concepto de potencial de referencia, articulando los fallos en la traducción y el cambio de significado asociados a la inconmensurabilidad.

Posteriormente, Pérez Ransanz (1999) ha afirmado la existencia de un dominio referencial compartido entre teorías inconmensurables, mientras que Bird (2000), señaló que la teoría causal puso de manifiesto las deficiencias semánticas de la inconmensurabilidad. Por su parte Sankey (2000) propuso una teoría causal descriptiva, como marco semántico para considerar la inconmensurabilidad como intraducibilidad local.

Sobre este contexto de debate, nuestro propósito es explorar algunos aspectos de la relación entre cambio de significado y cambio de referencia. Introduciremos los conceptos de fallo en la referencia y cambio de término, para mostrar que en la consideración de las relaciones significado-referencia, suelen agruparse en un mismo dominio casos de cambio teórico sumamente disímiles.

A partir de estas distinciones, concluiremos que el cambio de término es compatible tanto con el fallo como con la preservación de la referencia, por lo que el cambio de término es incompatible con el cambio de significado y con el cambio de referencia. En la misma dirección, defenderemos que el cambio de significado es compatible tanto con el cambio como con el fallo en la referencia y que los casos más característicos de fallo en la referencia involucran cambio de término, no cambio de significado. De esta manera, esperamos contribuir a una mejor distinción entre estas categorías semánticas, que usualmente suelen ser utilizadas de modo indistinto para categorizar fenómenos mas bien disímiles. Con ello esperamos obtener una imagen más ajustada al carácter multidimensional de los procesos de cambio semántico tal como se dan en las revoluciones científicas.

Martes 23 de agosto

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Addiction as partial excuse for morally blameworthy behavior

Suppose that both Diego and Pablo steal money from their grandmothers in order to buy cocaine. Now suppose that Pablo is severely addicted to the drug, and Diego is simply an occasional recreational user. Is that difference between them a sufficient reason for assessing differently their degree of blameworthiness for stealing the money? And if it is, what could be the appropriate justification of that assessment?

In this paper, I argue that severe cases of addiction may provide grounds for a partial excuse for morally blameworthy acts when these are closely and non-trivially connected with the addiction itself. The starting point of my argument is a review of the evidence that addiction involves a partial impairment of agents' capacities both to be receptive and to be reactive to relevant reasons when it comes to matters related with drug use, in a way that amounts to a partial impairment of control over drug-related behavior (AUTHOR RETRACTED). Indeed, there is a compelling case for thinking that drug-related desires (AUTHOR RETRACTED, Butlin & Papineau, 2017; Holton & Berridge, 2013) and drug-related thoughts and beliefs (Bickel et al., 2014; Levy, 2014; Pickard, 2016; Sripada, 2022) typically work in addiction in an anomalous way. This, I suggest, makes it likely that severely addicted agents may at times only partially enjoy some of the abilities that are key for normative competence, thus making it much harder for these agents to comply with relevant moral demands under certain conditions. If the foregoing view is correct, I argue, it is inappropriate to subject severely addicted agents to the same standard of moral appraisal as we hold non-addicted individuals facing under otherwise similar circumstances, as this would violate a plausible principle of fair opportunity underpinning our ordinary blaming and praising practices (Brink, 2021; Brink & Nelkin, 2013). Importantly, my argument supports a mitigation of blameworthiness rather than a full excuse or an exemption, as addicts' status as morally responsible agents is not jeopardized under my proposed account and their degree of reasons-responsiveness is plausibly still above the threshold for being an appropriate target of moral demand.



The plan for the paper is as follows. I first introduce some basic tools from reasons-responsiveness theories of moral responsibility (Brink, 2021; Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; Mckenna, 2013; Nelkin, 2011; Sartorio, 2016; Vargas, 2013; Wallace, 1994; Wolf, 1990). Then I put forward a view of the aspects of addiction that are relevant for an assessment of normative competence, and I argue for my main claims concerning how this should affect our assessment of degrees of blameworthiness in the relevant sorts of cases. In the remaining sections of the paper, I defend my account against four important objects.

These concern the possibility of tracing the addicted agent's responsibility for current wrongdoing to some prior moment in which she fully enjoyed normative competence, the alleged availability of therapeutic means to relieve her condition as grounds for a case of indirect responsibility, the potential moral costs involved in claiming that addicted agents are not fully responsible for some of their actions and whether my proposed account opens the gate for a more generalized scepticism concerning moral responsibility.

Martes 23 de agosto

Martín Fricke



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Can determinists act under the idea of freedom?

In the Third Section of the Groundwork, Kant famously claims that a rationally willed being “cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom” (Kant 2012, G 4, 448). On the face of it, this claim is incompatible with the existence of a certain class of determinists, namely those who deny that we are free. Since they deny that they are free, they seem to act, if anything, under an idea of unfreedom, not under the idea of freedom. I shall argue that this challenge to Kant’s claim is an instance of what Quassim Cassam (1997) calls, in a different context, the “problem of misconception”, which arises for belief-directed transcendental arguments. The transcendental argument aims to show that we must have a certain belief; here, the belief that we are free. However, even if the belief is true, undoubtedly there are some people around who do not have it. They have a misconception of themselves, which seems to show that there must be something wrong with the original transcendental argument.

It seems that, faced with the fact that there are people who are freedom-denying determinists and yet capable of acting rationally, Kant could make one of the following three replies:

- (1) There are no real freedom-denying determinists. The people who claim to be such do not really believe that they are not free.
- (2) There are real freedom-denying determinists. But although they believe that they are not free, they do not act under the idea of unfreedom. When they act, they act under the idea of freedom. This is compatible with belief in determinism and denial of freedom.
- (3) There are real freedom-denying determinists. Because of their views they are incapable of rational action. For them to act, requires them to be irrational; for they have to act under the idea of unfreedom, which is impossible for a rationally willed being.



In my paper, I will try to show that Kant's reply, according to the arguments in the Third Section of the Groundwork, would be (2). Acting under the idea of freedom does not, on Kant's view, involve believing that one is free or that determinism is false. Rather, it is simply a matter of not judging while being aware of being guided in one's judgment by invalid principles. I shall argue that such judgments are possible even if one believes in determinism and denies the reality of freedom.

There are several difficulties with Kant's suggestion. For example, it is unclear how judging is related to acting and it is hard to give an uncontroversial account of what makes a principle of action and/or judgment invalid. However, my purpose in this paper is not primarily to elucidate Kant, but rather to shine some light on the relation between our capacity to act and our self-conception as agents. I shall argue that this relation is rather loose, even in Kant.

To further illustrate this claim, I will examine a modified version of Kant's argument, according to which deliberating about what to do is incompatible with determinism. The idea here is that if there is no freedom to act in a variety of ways, then there is no point in deliberating about and deciding what to do. Rather, the appropriate stance, then, is theoretical: that of trying to find out what I will in fact do. But since we do deliberate about what to do, the conclusion of the argument is that, at least while deliberating, we must regard ourselves as free; we can only deliberate "under the idea of freedom".



However, again, the actual existence of persons who do not consider themselves to be free and yet seem to deliberate just as everyone else does casts doubt on the correctness of the argument. In my paper, I argue that it might be possible to deliberate under different conceptions of oneself as an agent and deliberator. It might be possible to view one's own deliberation not as determining an as yet open course of action, but as a way of finding out what my fate is. As the diversity of actually existing self-conceptions shows, we can act and deliberate while adhering to all kinds of philosophies of action, even freedom-denying ones. It is not plausible to think that action and deliberation require a determinate, let alone correct self-conception as an agent.

Martes 23 de agosto

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Unconscious perceptual judgment

1. Charles Travis (Travis 2004) has famously argued that the senses are silent, in that they take no stand on how things are. For example, visual perception places one's surroundings in view without representing them as being a certain way. It is up to the subject to judge how things are based on what is brought into their view by their sight.

2. Despite the ingenuity of Travis' arguments, many philosophers remain unpersuaded. This is, partially, because the view in question entails that perceptual judgment occurs in response to perceptual experience, which conflicts with empirical evidence suggesting that perceptual judgment precedes perceptual experience (Lyons 2020; Mandelbaum 2018) and influences its phenomenal character (Vetter and Newen 2014; Teufel and Nanay 2017; Cavedon-Taylor 2018). Call this 'the challenge of unconscious perceptual judgment'.

3. In this talk, I argue that the challenge of unconscious perceptual judgment can be overcome by adopting an amended version of the Purely Relational Theory of Perception (PR) (Stoneham 2008). According to PR, perception is entirely passive. Perceiving is just having something before the mind, in the sense that the perceived items are available for reason and judgement, but they are being perceived does not itself involve any mental activity. Perception occurs in the environment, not in the subject. Perception is not a state of the subject, but a relation in the world that enables the subject to form certain beliefs and behave in certain ways. Nothing that happens to the subject is a constitutive component of perception; at best, it might be a consequence or prerequisite of perception.

4. When combined with some plausible assumptions, PR reconciles the view that the senses are silent with the possibility of unconscious perceptual judgment. In short, the idea is that perceiving is just standing in specific relation to the perceived item, whereas unconscious perceptual judgment is a cognitive activity enabled by this relation. Unconscious perceptual judgment always occurs as a consequence of the fact that the relation holds. Because PR entails that the phenomenal character of perception is entirely constituted by the perceived items, the influence of unconscious perceptual judgment on the perceptual phenomenal character can only consist in selecting which of the perceived items become available for action and cognition, and of which of them the subject eventually becomes consciously aware.

Martes 23 de agosto**The unity of self-control**

Discussions of self-control loom large in philosophy, the cognitive, and the behavioral sciences (Bermúdez, 2018; Amaya, 2020). Despite the fact that these traditions seem to be working on one and the same phenomenon (at least, they tend to take each other as working on the same phenomenon), there has been little discussion among theorists working on different strands of it. As a result, we know very little about how the multiplicity of co-existing conceptual and methodological approaches can be integrated (for discussion, see Duckworth and Kern, 2011; Dang et al, 2020). Importantly, it is unclear whether self-control is a unified construct corresponding to a well-behaved psychological kind or, instead, refers to a collection of assorted capacities devoid of real unity (Herdova, 2017).

In this paper, I argue for an understanding of self-control as rational decision-making in the face of motivational conflicts. Although seemingly simple-minded, this way of understanding self-control helps understand why, in spite of the observed variability, self-control can be considered a well-unified construct. At the same time, it helps us make sense as to why different methodologies for studying self-control, and interventions to promote it, yield seemingly disparate results.

I begin the paper sketching the view of self-control as rational decision-making, by introducing two ideas. First, some theorists have assumed that the motivational conflicts that define self-control exist because we have competing motivational systems (Mele, 1987; Sripada, 2014). Instead, I argue that these conflicts are possible because the outcomes of feasible choices often have dissociable high-order properties. For instance, whereas some outcomes are valuable or representative of the kind of person we want to be, others are merely regarded as rewarding or enjoyable. Second, I argue that decision-making need not be, in Jerry Fodor's use of the term, isotropic. That is, not every property of an outcome needs to be taken into account when deciding whether one will try to promote it. Thus, sometimes we decide by considering only a subset of the base-properties of the outcomes: whether this food is tasty or healthy.

Santiago Amaya



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Other times we focus instead on their higher-order properties: whether this outcome is in line with one's prior commitments or not. From these two ideas, I claim, the notion of self-control as rational decision-making follows. In brief, self-control is exercised by virtue of making decisions that favor outcomes that have certain higher-order properties, namely, those that make the choice reasonable, by focusing the process of decision-making on these properties.

In the second part of the paper, I show why the proposed account helps us see the unity behind self-control. First, it allows us to see how exercises of self-control can help overcome seemingly different kinds of motivational conflicts: say, those giving rise to akrasia, as opposed to other forms of weakness of will (Jackson 1984; Holton 1999). In brief, to the extent that the motivational conflicts here are not between different rival motivational systems but between outcomes with different perceived properties, all of these conflicts are actually of the same kind. In addition, the account allows us to make sense of why self-control can best be achieved through a very different interventions (e.g. external and internal) with varying temporal dynamics: from habituation to motivational transformations to some varieties of impulse inhibition (Duckworth et al, 2016; Mylopolous and Pacherie, 2020; Bermúdez, 2021). Very briefly put, these interventions strategically make salient the high-order properties that make some of the outcomes preferable over their alternatives.

In the final part of the paper, I discuss two objections that can be raised to the present proposal and draw some implications to some current controversies in the field. The first concerns the lack of a mechanistic unity behind exercises of self-control, as understood here. The second concerns the notion of rationality that underlies this conception of self-control, specifically the worry that in some instances exercises of it can be actually contrary to reason. I answer these two objections by discussing the prospects of mechanist integration among exercises of self-control and by emphasizing the externalistic approach to the rationality of self-control that the present proposal embodies.

Martes 23 de agosto

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¿Son imputables las organizaciones? Revisión a las teorías de la acción intencional colectiva desde Hammond

En la presente investigación se buscará exponer una serie de argumentos en torno a la posibilidad de acción conjunta en las organizaciones. Para ello la ponencia se estructura de la siguiente manera: 1) primero se revisará el texto de Paul Hammond Distinguishing joint actions from collective actions (2015), donde se realiza una crítica a diversas teorías de la acción intencional colectiva; 2) posteriormente se revisará el actuar de las organizaciones desde la perspectiva de la sociología organizacional; 3) para finalizar se desarrollarán distintos comentarios sobre la posibilidad de responsabilidad en las organizaciones a partir de las implicancias que trae la crítica que desarrolla Hammond sobre la acción social colectiva con un caso de estudio.

En el texto citado, Hammond arguye que, contrario a teóricos de la acción intencional colectiva como Searle (1990, 1997, 2010) y Gilbert (1989, 1996), la acción social no implica en cada caso la existencia de una acción intencional conjunta. Autores como los mencionados, nos dice Hammond, están comprometidos con la idea de que en cada acción social los participantes individuales conciben en algún grado la razón de su actuar, es decir, las intenciones o compromisos relevantes de la acción colectiva son compartidos de algún modo por los individuos participantes de la acción. Por tanto, bajo estas perspectivas, el individuo ha de tener alguna conciencia (awareness) de la acción conjunta total llevada a cabo. Para mostrar que esto no se cumple en cada caso, el autor desarrolla un contraejemplo donde el modo de operar de un banco no cumple estas condiciones, ya que sus trabajadores solo conocen sus labores específicas y desconocen la acción total que sí es atribuible al banco. A partir de lo anterior, Hammond sugiere que es necesario buscar una noción de coordinación más débil que la de los teóricos de la acción conjunta para dar cuenta de acciones de entidades colectivas.



Siguiendo la crítica de Hammond, se buscará dar una propuesta sobre el concepto de coordinación a partir de la sociología organizacional (Luhmann, 2000; Rodríguez, 2020), pues desde la Escuela de Relaciones Humanas se observa una fuerte influencia desde el entorno social hacia el actuar de los individuos dentro de las organizaciones. En este sentido, los individuos actúan de acuerdo con las relaciones que tienen con sus pares. Además, es relevante comprender las organizaciones como un sistema autopoietico (Maturana & Varela, 1984; Luhmann, 2000) en que la organización rescata lo que más le sirve del entorno social para su prevalencia, con una cultura y normas propias. De hecho, las organizaciones mal constituidas no prevalecen (Rodríguez, 2020).

En cuanto a la teoría de la responsabilidad de la acción social resulta interesante presentar el caso de la guerra entre Rusia y Ucrania, donde se busca constantemente un responsable por el conflicto. En este sentido surgen las preguntas: ¿Quién tiene la responsabilidad? ¿Se puede hablar de una guerra entre dos Estados o sería más adecuado referirse a una guerra entre individuos pertenecientes a un Estado?

Martes 23 de agosto

John Anderson



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A favor de una versión no-ingenua de la atención conjunta

La atención conjunta nombra una clase de episodios de interacción social en el que se resuelven tareas cooperativamente tal que dicha cooperación está soportada y explicada a partir de un entendimiento/conocimiento compartido, no-proposicional y fundamentalmente perceptual. En virtud esto último, se ha argumentado que este entendimiento/conocimiento depende de un rasgo de la percepción: a saber, depende de que la percepción sea compartida o pública (overt).

Un ejemplo de esta clase de episodios es este:

Un padre y su hijo (de 2 años) están armando conjuntamente una torre de juguete

Esto cuenta como un ejemplo de atención conjunta porque su éxito depende necesariamente de que padre-e-hijo tengan percepción compartida/pública respecto de la torre de juguete. Explicar la atención conjunta implica describir en qué consiste que la percepción sea compartida/pública. John Campbell defiende lo que llamo una versión ingenua de la atención conjunta. Afirma que

“Deberíamos considerar [la atención conjunta] como una relación triádica entre sujeto, co-perceptor y objeto. La relación es primitiva: x e y están atendiendo conjuntamente a z . Si estás en este estado, entonces puedes tener un conocimiento introspectivo de éste, de manera similar a tu conocimiento de otros estados mentales tuyos.” (Campbell-2011:416)

Según esta versión, la atención conjunta es un estado perceptual triádico constituido por el sujeto, el objeto y el co-perceptor. Estar en dicho estado es suficiente para conocer introspectivamente que se está compartiendo percepción (de la misma manera que cada sujeto conoce sus propios estados mentales). Y, por esto, describir en qué consiste la comunión/publicidad de la percepción implica describir cómo la introspección permite acceder a este rasgo perceptual. Así, si un sujeto no supiera introspectivamente que su percepción es compartida/pública, no estaría en un estado de atención conjunta.



Mi objetivo es argumentar en contra de esta versión ingenua y favorecer una versión que, por contraste, llamaré atención conjunta no-ingenua. Mi afirmación será que durante los episodios de atención conjunta los sujetos no pueden saber introspectivamente que su percepción es compartida/pública. Mi argumento será el siguiente:

1. Si un sujeto puede saber introspectivamente que está en un estado de atención conjunta respecto a un objeto, entonces hay una manera de percibir el objeto tal que facilita dicha introspección: se percibe como compartido/público.
2. Si esto es verdad, puede describirse/especificarse la manera como luce el objeto a ambos sujetos simultáneamente. [Pero,]
3. [En opinión de Campbell] no puede describirse cómo luce un objeto simultáneamente a ambos sujetos. [Por lo tanto,]
4. Un sujeto no puede saber introspectivamente que está en un estado de atención conjunta.

Mi presentación consistirá en defender la tercera premisa basándome en la discusión de la siguiente afirmación: “usted puede saber con cierta certeza cuál es el objeto que estamos percibiendo conjuntamente, sin que se le haya ocurrido que existe tal cosa como la manera en la que me encuentro [perceptualmente] con el objeto” (Campbell-2011:428). Si Campbell tiene razón, la introspección no le revela (al sujeto) la manera en la que el objeto luce al co-perceptor y, por lo tanto, tampoco le revela que el objeto de atención conjunta es compartido/público.



Basado en esto, concluiré que esta versión ingenua de la atención conjunta no es una buena explicación en cuanto que estar en un episodio de atención conjunta no me da acceso introspectivo de cuál es el objeto percibido conjuntamente. Esto me dará espacio para motivar una hipótesis que llamaré atención conjunta no-ingenua (o, por el hacer el contraste, atención conjunta astuta), según la cual la atención conjunta es un tipo de actividad cooperativa (requerida para resolver tareas) basada fundamentalmente en el ejercicio conjunto de habilidades perceptuales. De acuerdo con esta hipótesis: durante los episodios de atención conjunta, mientras más avance la resolución de la tarea, más claro será cuál es el objeto percibido conjuntamente.

Martes 23 de agosto

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Categorías sociales en modo funcionalista

Muchas de las discusiones sobre clases (kinds) en ciencias han girado en torno a si existe un único patrón de clasificación científica. Tradicionalmente, el concepto de “clase natural” buscaba dar cuenta de un único esquema, una forma unificada de justificación de inferencias inductivas para las ciencias que otorgara algún tipo de realidad a las categorías postuladas en el quehacer científico. No obstante, en los últimos años ha rondado idea según la cual no existe tal único patrón (e.g. Ereshefsky y Reydon, 2015). Este resultado invita a repensar los esquemas clasificatorios, no solo entre disciplinas, sino a su interior.

En las ciencias sociales, esta discusión se ha dado en el marco del debate sobre la ontología social. Este debate incluye la pregunta en torno a los constituyentes de las categorías sociales, sean estos por ejemplo estados mentales individuales, colectivos, o algún otro tipo de objeto o propiedad. De manera análoga a la discusión sobre las clases en ciencia, la ontología social también ha comenzado a considerar la alternativa de que existan varios tipos de clases sociales, cada uno con formas únicas de inferencia. Por ejemplo, Epstein (2015) sostiene que hay distintas formas de anclaje para las clases sociales, esto es, distintas maneras de construir marcos para fijar hechos sociales. Por su parte, Khalidi (2013) ha sugerido al menos tres tipos de clases sociales: aquellas dependientes parcialmente de estados mentales de individuos, aquellas dependientes completamente, y aquellas que son independientes de estos.



En esta charla, me gustaría explorar la idea de aplicar esquemas de individuación y clasificación funcionalistas a las categorías sociales. En concreto, me interesa plantear la siguiente pregunta: ¿es posible generalizar el funcionalismo a las categorías sociales? Las consecuencias de plantear esta pregunta llevan a resultados interesantes para la clasificación en ciencias sociales. Si es posible entender todas las clases sociales en términos funcionalistas, ¿qué separa entonces las clases sociales de otras clases científicas funcionales? En otras palabras, ¿qué es lo particular a las clases sociales entre todas las clases funcionales? Por otra parte, si no es posible generalizar el funcionalismo a las clases sociales, ¿qué propiedad existe en estas últimas que resulte irreducible a patrones de interacción causal?

Para adelantar la discusión, procederé en tres partes. Primero, definiré cómo entiendo el funcionalismo y por qué es plausible la generalización a las categorías sociales. Aquí discutiré con algunas propuestas funcionalistas locales en ontología social, como el funcionalismo de Hindriks y Guala (2021) sobre las instituciones y algunas propuestas anteriores como la de Merton (1957/1968) y Radcliffe-Brown (1935). Segundo, plantearé la posibilidad de generalizar el funcionalismo a las categorías sociales, discutiendo las propuestas de Khalidi y Epstein. Finalmente, esbozaré algunos obstáculos de la generalización funcionalista, presentando algunas categorías que se resisten a este análisis. En concreto, exploraré la posibilidad de que existan categorías identitarias o normativas que no admitan reducción funcional. Con esto se espera avanzar en el debate sobre la reducción en ciencias sociales y la presunta existencia de propiedades sociales irreducibles.

Martes 23 de agosto

Santiago Echeverri



Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México



Error possibilities and the social division of epistemic labor

Muchas de las discusiones sobre clases (kinds) en ciencias han girado en torno a si existe un único patrón de clasificación científica. Tradicionalmente, el concepto de “clase natural” buscaba dar cuenta de un único esquema, una forma unificada de justificación de inferencias inductivas para las ciencias que otorgara algún tipo de realidad a las categorías postuladas en el quehacer científico. No obstante, en los últimos años ha rondado idea según la cual no existe tal único patrón (e.g. Ereshefsky y Reydon, 2015). Este resultado invita a repensar los esquemas clasificatorios, no solo entre disciplinas, sino a su interior.

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Martes 23 de agosto

Emociones políticas colectivas

Las emociones han suscitado innumerables debates filosóficos sobre su naturaleza e influencia. Los acercamientos de los que ha sido objeto son comúnmente presentados desde la perspectiva del individuo: es el sujeto el que experimenta la emoción y sus influencias a nivel físico y psicológico. A pesar de esto, no parece incorrecto -al menos intuitivamente- hablar de emociones grupales o colectivas, particularmente en contextos políticos. Tiene sentido decir por ejemplo que al menos un grupo de alemanes se sienta culpable por las atrocidades cometidas contra los judíos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Kapczynski, 2008); o que en escenarios posteriores a procesos de paz, los miembros de un grupo muestren arrepentimiento y pidan perdón en nombre de su colectividad por haber infligido daños a otra colectividad (López, Andrade y Correa, 2016). En este trabajo, mi objetivo será centrarme en la posibilidad de hablar de emociones colectivas de este tipo: las que ocurren en contextos políticos.

Los casos aquí ilustrados y otros similares muestran al menos dos problemas filosóficos que me propongo explorar. El primero de ellos está relacionado con el sujeto al que se atribuye la emoción. En la experiencia emocional paradigmática, los procesos fisiológicos concomitantes y los estados mentales relacionados creencias o deseos- son propios de una persona. Hablar de emociones colectivas requiere tener presente, sin embargo, la forma en la que se entiende qué es una colectividad. En este trabajo defenderé una de las maneras en las que se ha propuesto abordar este asunto: la 'agregativa' o 'individualista', según la cual las emociones colectivas consisten en la coordinación o convergencia de las emociones individuales. Uno de los autores que defiende una tesis de este tipo es Michael Brady (2016), que considera que a nivel individual, las emociones hacen llamativos ciertos rasgos de objetos o situaciones a través de la atención. Según Brady, las emociones colectivas son una sumatoria de estados mentales individuales. Esto, junto con rasgos de contagio emocional y la disposición de adherirse a la emoción de otros, hacen posible pensar una experiencia emocional colectiva, que favorece el llamado de atención de los líderes, quienes pueden intervenir sobre temas importantes para las comunidades.

Diana Rojas



Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México





En segundo lugar, exploraré una noción de emoción política colectiva. Esto requiere abordar el problema filosófico de la incidencia de las emociones en contextos políticos. La exponente más destacada en la discusión acerca de este tema es Martha Nussbaum (2013), quien argumenta en su libro *Political Emotions* que el amor y la compasión son dos emociones centrales en la construcción de relaciones políticas saludables para una sociedad justa. En el marco de este debate se destaca también la bibliografía relacionada con emociones particulares como el miedo (Tappolet, 2016), la ira (Miceli y Castelfranchi, 2019) o la culpa (Tollefsen, 2006). Son principalmente estas tres emociones las que han sido estudiadas desde disciplinas como la psicología (Bar-Tal, 2001) o la sociología (Demertzis, 2013) y que pueden encontrar coherencia conceptual desde un análisis filosófico juicioso.

Martes 23 de agosto

The priority map

Recently there has been much debate about empirical grounds for attributing some iconic, rather than propositional, structure to representational states and psychological capacities. The structure is assumed to mark important cuts between psychological capacities, to wit, between perception and thought. No extant proposal is fully convincing, however. In this paper, I propose an alternative way to argue for attributing iconic structure, relying on models from cognitive neuroscience. I introduce the case of the priority map. I argue that this map has a topographic representational structure, a structure similar to that of a physical map.

My argument goes as follows.

I first identify three roles of topographic representational structure in constituting mental states: it imposes proprietary semantic import, structural constraints, and enables structural transitions. First, topographic structure carries the semantic import of being about some space. Second, topographic structure imposes the constraint that representational constituents be composed within the topographic structure. Third, such structure enables transitions that capitalize on this structure, by manipulating the structure.

Next, I describe the priority map mechanism's characteristic transitions. They are transitions of updating priority assignments in a representation of the visual field. The characteristic transitions merge priority assignments from different maps; and they average priority-values around possible fixations.

Denis Buehler



Institute Jean Nicod





Physiologically based models in cognitive neuroscience explain these characteristic transitions as implemented by manipulations of topographically structured neural maps, especially in the superior colliculus. The manipulations strongly resemble physical manipulations of ordinary physical maps. Merging is implemented through physiological connections linking different neurons corresponding to the same location in represented space. Averaging is implemented by interactions of neurons in a neural map, in virtue of their physical distance from each other. Neurons in SC exhibit Mexican hat-profile. This means that for neighbouring neurons within the excitatory radius, the activity of the neurons will mutually reinforce. For neurons outside this radius, inhibitory connections will mutually suppress activity. The effect that a neuron's activity has on other neurons in the map is thus a function of (i) the intensity of its activity, (ii) its specific Gaussian activity profile, and (iii) the distance between the neuron and its neighbours as measured on the SC map. For clusters of relatively high priority positions within an (empirically determined) area for which neurons laterally interact, this will lead to a convergence of excitatory activity roughly at the centre of gravity of those positions. Many saliency peaks clustered together will result in one, higher priority peak roughly at the centre of the area constituted by those positions on the SC map. They thus implement the computation of averaging priority for an area around a possible fixation.

I argue that, in implementing characteristic transitions, the topographic neural structure grounds the three roles of topographic representational structure in representational transitions. This is why we best explain the characteristic transitions by assuming that these neural structures help constitute the representational structure of those states. I thus offer an entirely novel argument for attributing topographic structure.

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Martes 23 de agosto

Keynote speaker #2 Amalia Amaya



Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México -
Universidad de Edimburgo



Virtudes, argumentación jurídica, y ética judicial

NO TENEMOS EL ABSTRACT

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Rodrigo Silva & Fabrizio Manni



Universidad Diego Portales



Libros en cuestión: En torno a la cognición social y la segunda persona en la interacción humana

Estructura de la sesión

10:00-10:20 Diana Pérez y Antoni Gomila, *Précis de Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction*.

10:20-10:40 Comentarios por Diana Marcela Rojas (UNAM).

10:40-11:00 Comentarios por Miguel Ángel Pérez (Universidad Javeriana).

11:00-11:20 Comentarios por Miguel Ángel Sebastián (UNAM).

11:20-11:40 Respuesta a los comentarios de Diana Pérez y Antoni Gomila

11:40-12:00 Discusión con el público.

Miércoles 24 de agostoDubian Cañas Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México **Can historical evidence adjudicate the selective realism debate? Case study and epistemic evaluation of philosophical disagreement**

Although the use of historical case studies as evidence of philosophical claims has been of central importance in the selective realism debate (Lyons & Vickers 2021), a second-order argument against the legitimacy of this methodology has been advanced in recent years (Chakravartty, 2017; Kinzel, 2015, 2016; Schickore, 2018). According to this argument, historical evidence cannot adjudicate philosophical disagreements in general because historical reconstructions are theory-laden, thereby historical data are not neutral with regards to the philosophical claims being tested. This argument identifies two kinds of standards of adjudication as available but indicates that they are insufficient to settle conflicts between competing philosophical positions regarding the same historical episode. On the one hand, there are philosophical standards (PSs) that are not neutral because they make up the auxiliary theory to interpret historical material; on the other hand, there are historiographical standards (HSs) that underdetermine the rivals since such standards are neutral but too weak. As a result, specific issues as to whether we are justified in being a realist or not regarding some parts of our current scientific theories cannot be decided by appealing to the history of science.

This paper aims to refuse this argument. I shall provide a case study together with an epistemic evaluation of the disagreement about the strategy of 'selective confirmation' (SCD) (Psillos, 1999 vs. Stanford 2006). SCD has been over the possibility to establish an explicit, historically reliable criterion for identifying those theoretical elements being both responsible for the empirical success and retained across theory change, and the attention has been focused on two relevant historical episodes: the caloric theory of heat and the luminiferous ether. I shall argue that SCD is to be explained in terms of a resolvable conflict in light of the relevant historical evidence, and HSs play a crucial role in adjudicating this disagreement. Whereas Bolinska, & Martin (2020) defend that the application of PSs can settle philosophical disputes, I maintain that PSs cannot be applied successfully in SCD.



These authors state that PSs are to be adopted on independent grounds so as to connect historical evidence with philosophical claims, but this goal cannot be accomplished when independent grounds for PS are also a matter of dispute. For that reason, I examine how HSs are actually applied in SCD and claim that HSs can arbitrate the conflict successfully.

I shall show that: (1) Psillos, and Stanford agree on a standard of “diachronic historical adequacy”, according to which selective realism must be tested against past scientists’ judgments of selective confirmation. (2) This standard is neutral with respect to both philosophical positions. (3) When the standard is applied, the textual evidence from the relevant historical episodes suggests, as Stanford claims, that these scientists’ judgments are not generally reliable. (4) Therefore, the historical evidence plus diachronic historical adequacy ultimately favours Stanford’s conclusion that a historically reliable criterion of selective confirmation is hard to be established. Finally, I conclude from my case study that the canons of the history of science can adjudicate philosophical disagreements more generally.

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Diego Ríos & Graciela Kúhle

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas -
Heibronn University**Multiple realization and evolutionary dynamics: a game-theoretic perspective**

Multiple realization occurs when a phenomenon is implemented by different realizers, and it is recalcitrant to a uniform physical explanation. In order to provide a mechanism for multiple realization, some authors postulate a model of selection in which realizers play an adaptive role (Papineau, 2009, 2010). We call this the functional-cum-selective account. The main idea is that whereas variation produces a continuous supply of potential realizers, differential replication retains those that successfully perform an advantageous function. In this way, multiple realizers may come to coexist despite lacking a common physical property, and multiple realization is vindicated.

In this paper, we argue that the functional-cum-selective approach needs revision. The main problem is that it focuses only on whether a realizer performs an adaptive function, disregarding the specific fitness of the realizers. We claim that due to this omission, the functional-cum-selective account is unable to explain why realizers that are apt to perform a task need not persist. To circumvent this problem, we provide an evolutionary game-theoretic account of multiple realization whose upshot is that retained realizers that are subject to common selection pressures need to be equally fit.

Furthermore, we argue that the condition of equal fitness sheds light on the scope and the level of multiple realization. With respect to the scope, the mainstream literature deals with across- and within-species multiple realization in a uniform way. We argue that these two types of multiple realization should not be conflated when the within-species realizers are subject to common selection pressures. To support this claim, we develop a typology of multiple realization that specifies the dynamics of individual realizers, and show that the distinction between across- and within-species is inconsequential for the prevalence of multiple realization. What matters is whether the realizers compete within the same niche.



Considering the levels of realization, the literature does not pin down the conditions under which different levels of the organization may become multiply realized. We model multiple realizations by means of an evolutionary game theoretic set-up in which the evolutionary stable equilibrium entails the coexistence of more than one realizer. Applying off-the-shelf evolutionary game theoretic results, we show that multiply realized behaviours at the population level may but need not entail multiple realizations at lower levels of analysis.

The simple model developed in this paper makes three main contributions. First, it qualifies the functional-cum-selective account by adding the condition of equal expected fitness. The idea that an organism needs some way of performing a function falls short of specifying the full set of conditions under which multiple realizers come to persist in the population. The functional-cum-selective account builds on the principle that realizes that performing a function will coexist, whereas the fitness-based model contends that outperformed realizers will be driven out of the population even when they perform the task at hand.

The second contribution of the fitness-based account is that it distinguishes between multiple realizations at different levels of organization. As it turns out, multiple realizations at the population level need not entail multiple realizations at the individual level. A polymorphic population may consist of either polymorphic or monomorphic individuals as long as both phenotypes have the same expected fitness. Furthermore, once the payoffs are given, our account predicts the share of each realizer in the population. This analysis is beyond the scope of the functional-cum-selective account.



The last contribution of the fitness-based account is that it qualifies the scope of multiple realization by introducing the notion of competitive niches. The main idea is that the equal fitness condition is binding only when the realizers are subject to common selection pressures. Across- and within-species multiple realization differ in this respect. Whereas the former involves only disjoint niches—thereby falling in the category of inter-niche multiple realization—the latter usually concerns cases of intra-niche multiple realization. Because the Fodorean and the functional-cum-selective account are unaware of the role of competitive niches, they overlook this difference.


Miércoles 24 de agostoAna Polakof Universidad de la República
del Uruguay **Recognizing non-derogatory uses of slurs with experimental methods**


The slur *puto/faggot* is considered to be one of the most offensive gender-related slurs by Spanish speakers in the Rio de la Plata, see fig. 1. When *puto* is used as a slur, as a part of hate speech, it is used to offend and to derogate homosexual men. However, it may also be used solely with the intention to offend in contexts in which there is no derogatory intention toward homosexual men (see Davis & McCready, 2020).

We defend that the use of experimental methods can help us to better understand when *puto* is being used to offend and to derogate, and when it is used solely with the intention to offend. To do this, we present two offline experiments. First, we present an experiment with gender-related slurs, in which slurs were presented in isolation, and participants had to choose an at-issue content, a non-at-issue content, both, or neither. The data of 200 participants entered that final study. Second, we present an exploratory experiment which was designed to test whether Nacional's football fans use *puto* to express a negative attitude toward Peñarol's fans or toward homosexual men in Uruguay. That is, it was designed to test whether in football fans contexts the slur is used to derogate, to offend, or both. The data of 203 participants entered the final study.

The first of our experiments involves gender-related slurs (as *puto/faggot*), as critical items, and swearwords (as *imbécil/imbecile*), as control items. The participants judged *puto/faggot* to have more at-issue content than non-at-issue content in isolation, as fig. 2 shows. These results suggest that we can use *puto/faggot* with the intention to derogate and to offend. The second experiment explored what Nacional's fans intend to express when they sing at the stadium, for instance, "los del manya son todos putos/those of Peñarol are all faggots" (at: <https://laabdon.com/canciones-lbdp/>). The results present a different picture. Nacional's fans seem to use the slur only with non-at issue content, even though it has an associated at-issue content related to homosexual men, see fig. 3. Thus, we may assume that when football fans sing songs which contain *puto*, they intend to express a negative emotion toward the other football fans, and not toward homosexual men.

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Overall, we defend that experimental approaches can help us to better understand how slurs work. They are sometimes used with the intention to offend and to derogate, and sometimes, in particular contexts, they are used solely with the intention to offend. If we can understand the contexts in which the different uses occur, then we will potentially be able to differentiate when they are being used as a part of hate speech from when they are not.

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Marco Ruffino & Filipe Martone



Universidad de Campinas

**Reference to the abstract and the Chomskyan objection**

In this paper we offer an overview of the question of whether there is reference to abstract entities. We contrast the classic affirmative answer of philosophers like Frege, Russell and Quine with Chomsky and his followers' recommendation of construing genuine reference as a relation obtaining between naturally describable relata. The latter has as consequence that there is no such reference – although Chomsky himself, strangely enough, seems to admit that there is reference in mathematical languages, which very clearly do not refer to “identifiable physical features of the external world”. We argue that the reasons for following Chomsky's recommendation are not very persuasive. A more inclusive notion of reference that sees not only mathematical objects, but also other abstract (or semi-abstract) entities like books, nations and videogames, is at the core of a very successful explanatory project in semantics. Abandoning such a notion would of course make the life of the naturalist much easier, but at the price of giving up a neat explanation of important semantic data. Finally, we argue that the identity conditions of mathematical objects are in part determined by human perspective. Moreover, following Fine (2007), we argue that even the identity conditions of expressions in formal languages is dependent on human perspective (or, to use Fine's own terminology, on coordination, which is not a relation intrinsic to the expressions but is something imposed by us). If so, the same reasons Chomsky and his followers advance to reject reference for natural languages would apply to formal languages as well. As we understand it, this can be seen as an ad hominem argument against the Chomskyan skepticism regarding reference.

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Joaquín Guiannotti



University of Birmingham



Brutalist fundamentalism and naturalistic metaphysics

Metaphysicians and physicists are often portrayed as being like cats and dogs. However, despite the recognition of substantial differences between their disciplines, both parties agree on the importance of the concept of fundamentality in their theorizing. An immediate question arises: How should we articulate the notion of fundamentality in a way that is both metaphysically insightful and informed by our best science?

My aim is to advance the debate concerning this question. To this end, I discuss a ground-theoretic approach to brutalism: the doctrine that the fundamental is that which is brute—namely, that which lacks explanation.

According to the very popular radical brutalism, the fundamental facts are those that are wholly ungrounded. These facts are radically brute: there is no metaphysical explanation of why they obtain. Against this view, several metaphysicians have argued in favour of the existence of moderately brute facts. These facts are merely partially grounded. They are fundamental yet have some in completable partial grounds. The existence of moderately brute facts undermines the tenability of radical brutalism. However, considerations in favour of moderately brute facts typically rely on controversial scenarios. These involve metaphysically possible cases that allegedly violate an orthodox principle of completeness (e.g., Fine 2012): a fact f is a partial ground of g if there is a (possibly empty) plurality of facts Γ such that f, Γ is a full ground of g .



My goal is to show that the naturalistic metaphysician, who minimally believes that physics should inform our characterization of the fundamental, has more compelling reasons to reject both completeness and radical brutalism. By defending a novel grounding interpretation of an argument put forward by Kerry McKenzie (2017), I will argue that plausible consideration from quantum field theory yield the existence of moderately brute facts. My focus will be on the fact that our world instantiates a distinctive suite of fundamental kinds of quantum fields. I will argue that present-day physics can only provide partial, but not a full ground for it. This fact is, therefore, moderately brute. To defend the originality of my approach, I will show that it successfully resists three important objections raised by De Rizzo (2019) against McKenzie's original argument.

I will conclude by discussing the implications of the existence of moderately brute physical facts. Should the naturalistic metaphysician endorse moderate brutalism, namely the view that all fundamental facts are moderately brute? I will argue for a negative answer. As a more promising alternative, I will defend the adoption of pluralistic brutalism: the view that some fundamental facts are moderately brute, and others are radically so. My argument will be one by elimination: if radical brutalism is false and moderate brutalism is empirically unwarranted, then the naturalistic metaphysician should endorse pluralistic brutalism. My conclusion will be that the advertised form of pluralism about brute facts is better suited to capturing the kinds of fundamental facts we can expect to find in nature.

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Pablo López-Silva



Universidad de Valparaíso



Delirios psicóticos y adaptabilidad biológica mínima

Debido a la forma en que desafían algunas de las concepciones más fundamentales acerca de la naturaleza de la conciencia, los delirios se han transformado en foco de análisis filosófico analítico durante los últimos años. En este contexto, este fenómeno se ha entendido predominantemente como un tipo de creencia no-paradigmática. En la actualidad existe amplio desacuerdo respecto del rol que este tipo de estados mentales cumple en un organismo. Comúnmente la literatura acepta la idea de que los delirios podrían ser psicológicamente adaptativos (ya que ayudarían a un organismo a enfrentar situaciones afectivamente desbordantes), sin embargo, niega la idea de que puedan ser biológicamente adaptativos. El argumento principal es que los delirios no incrementarían de ninguna forma las posibilidades de adaptación de un sujeto al medio ambiente. Esta presentación sugiere que existen buenas razones para creer que los delirios psicóticos podrían tener un valor biológicamente adaptativo. Para esto, elaboro dos argumentos. El argumento fenomenológico indicará que los delirios psicóticos surgen como una forma de reorganizar la unidad de la conciencia de los pacientes, permitiéndoles un intercambio – aunque defectuoso – mínimamente funcional con el medio ambiente más cercano. La evidencia para este argumento proviene de las descripciones de casos de sujetos psicóticos que transitan de una atmósfera delirante a la experiencia de delirios reportando un nivel considerable de insight y reorganización fenoménica de su experiencia del sí-mismo y el mundo. Llamaré a esto, adaptabilidad biológica mínima. Por otra parte, el argumento desde la selección se hace de los recursos de las teorías evolutivas actuales para indicar que no existe una continuidad necesaria entre elementos adaptativos locales y mecanismos adaptativos a nivel de especie. La idea es que algo puede ser biológicamente adaptativo a nivel local, sin que sea un rasgo dominante seleccionado por la especie en su historia evolutiva. Esto abriría la puerta para indicar que, a pesar de esto, los delirios psicóticos podrían ser mínimamente adaptativos en un nivel local. Finalmente, se terminará revisando las consecuencias de la tesis principal de la presentación para las teorías etiológicas de los delirios psicóticos en la actualidad.

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Diego Becerra 

Universidad de Valparaíso 

Representing structures yet to be found representational and expressive role of mathematics in the Hodgkin-Huxley mode

Just as the formulation of theories within physics in a mathematical language often leads to new physical predictions (e.g. Maxwell equations of electromagnetism), sometimes mathematical formulations of biological theories can end up predicting aspects of the underlying phenomena.

In 1952, Hodgkin and Huxley presented a series of papers which laid the foundations on which our understanding of initiation and propagation of action potentials through excitable cells is built. There, they developed the following differential equations:

$$I = C_M \frac{dV_m}{dt} + \bar{g}_K n^4 (V_m - V_K) + \bar{g}_{Na} m^3 h (V_m - V_{Na}) + \bar{g}_l (V_m - V_l)$$

$$\frac{dn}{dt} = \alpha_n (1 - n) - \beta_n n$$

$$\frac{dm}{dt} = \alpha_m (1 - m) - \beta_m m$$

$$\frac{dh}{dt} = \alpha_h (1 - h) - \beta_h h$$

Where I is the current, C_M is membrane capacitance, $V_m(t)$ is the membrane potential (i.e. voltage), g is conductance; α and β are rate functions which vary with voltage but not with time; and the subscripts K, Na and l are Potassium, Sodium, and 'leak' ions respectively, thus, V_X is the equilibrium voltage for a given species of ion X. Finally: n , m , and h are described in the original paper as dimensionless variables or quantities which can vary between 0 and 1. Hodgkin & Huxley (1952) used exponential functions to fit the time course of the sodium and potassium conductances ($g_{Na}(t)$ and $g_K(t)$ respectively) during electrophysiological experiments with squid's axons, and simplified them obtaining parameters with third (and fourth) power terms: g_{am^3h} and g_{n^4} respectively. Then, the exponent of n , and m was interpreted by the authors as the number of activating charged particles occupying certain region of the membrane; and h was an inactivating charged molecule in sodium conductance. It's worth to mention that the biophysical interpretation of n^4 and m^3h is usually left out from philosophical analyses of the model (cf. Craver, 2008; Bogen, 2008; Pence, 2017).

The existence of ion channels in the membrane of cells through which Na^+ and K^+ current flows was proposed two years after (del Castillo & Katz, 1954). It took two decades to gather evidence of their existence and half a century to discover the molecular counterparts of n_4 and m_{3h} (Aggarwal & MacKinnon, 1996; Chanda & Bezanilla, 2002; Chanda et al., 2004).

In this paper I will present an historical reconstruction of Hodgkin & Huxley's differential equations interpretation (which aim to model action potentials) as a case in point of an anti-realist account of the role of mathematics in scientific modeling.

Following Bueno (2016), mathematical notions play inferential, representational, and expressive roles in our scientific theories about the world. Here, what could have been a curve-fitting maneuver (as Bogen, Craver and Pence assert) representing the ions' conductance kinetics but without any ontological commitment, was actually interpreted –albeit cautiously– as expressing claims about the physical structure of the system in question, i.e., physical gates in cells membranes: for example, n_4 can be (and was) interpreted as expressing four independent events with equal probability. Furthermore, after the discovery of the molecular structure of ion channels, in current interpretations of the Hodgkin-Huxley model those quantities represent four independent voltage sensors of potassium and sodium channels. Nevertheless, Hodgkin and Huxley themselves regarded their model as descriptive and warned that “the success of the equations is no evidence in favour of the mechanism of permeability change that we tentatively had in mind when formulating them” (1952, p.541).

It is relevant to highlight that here (i) the mathematical model merely hints at some underlying cause of the non-linear behavior of the data, so, we cannot talk about an isomorphism with specific physical mechanisms or structures, for the model represents mainly kinetics, and the structural parameters are very loose representations; and (ii) the mathematical model is highly idealized and simplified (doesn't work for longer or shorter timescales than roughly a single spike, doesn't take into account the geometry of the cell, summarizes a large number of channels in only one term, requires extra parameters when the cell expresses other types of channels, is less realistic than even simpler models such as Integrate and Fire models (Meunier & Segev, 2002; Brette, 2015), etc.). Yet, with all of those idealizations and even against the authors considerations, it allows us to obtain inferences about the system in question, it can represent core structural and kinetic properties of several excitable cells, and it allow us to express concisely some relations among electrophysiological events and their core (causal) mechanisms. I will argue that this tension can be solved by interpreting the model as representing restrictions in a parameter state-space, where the squid axon or any excitable cell in particular are partial instantiations of a correspondent point in the representational state-space of the model. For this, the mathematical model need not to be regarded as true, nor to be framed in a model-theoretical account, and its heuristic role in discovering biophysical mechanisms doesn't depend on the existence of mathematical objects, but of a partial homomorphism between the interpretation of the mathematical model and the excitable cell.

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Ignacio Cervieri



Universidad de la República del Uruguay

El antirepresentacionalismo y la concepción predictiva de la percepción

Existe una forma de argumentar en contra de las tesis antirepresentacionales de la percepción que apela al componente predictivo que parece estar presente en la manera en que opera nuestro sistema perceptual. De acuerdo con esta concepción, nuestro sistema perceptual no se atendería exclusivamente a la información que obtiene del exterior para generar sus outputs. En ciertas ocasiones le resultaría más eficaz evitar el procesamiento de información externa, utilizando en su lugar los resultados de apelar a información previamente recogida. Nuestras experiencias perceptuales serían, por lo tanto, el resultado de la combinación del procesamiento de la información recogida por nuestros órganos sensoriales junto con la puesta en práctica de procesos predictivos en los que, en aras de maximizar su rendimiento, se arriesga una hipótesis.

En esta comunicación intentaré defender la tesis que defiende la compatibilidad entre la propuesta antirepresentacionista y la concepción predictiva. Para ello resultará necesario mirar con atención la manera en que la concepción predictiva es utilizada para cuestionar al antirepresentacionalismo. Creo que en este sentido existen dos componentes de la concepción predictiva que no siempre están correctamente distinguidos y que en última instancia generan dos tipos de argumentos en contra del antirepresentacionalismo. Uno de estos componentes apunta al hecho de que nuestra relación con el entorno no tiene la inmediatez que el antirepresentacionalismo parecería suponer. En este sentido, considero que si bien hay aquí una apelación al aval de resultados novedosos en el ámbito de las ciencias cognitivas, el peso filosófico de su argumentación no está tan lejos de cierto argumento tradicional (y ajeno a cualquier resultado de investigaciones empíricas) en contra del antirepresentacionalismo para el cual existe una respuesta consistente.



Si bien, como acabo de mencionar, el argumento en contra del antirepresentacionalismo basado en la concepción predictiva puede considerarse como una reversión de un argumento ya utilizado y respondido, es importante mencionar que esta versión introduce algunas características novedosas que podrían verse como al menos debilitando en algo a la posición antirepresentacionista y al argumento que éste tradicionalmente ha utilizado para defenderse frente a la versión tradicional de este ataque.

En esta presentación tomaré en cuenta este hecho, y reconoceré que el antirepresentacionalismo enfrentado a esta nueva versión del argumento en su contra se verá obligado a aceptar algunas consecuencias de su postura que para algunos podrían resultar poco deseables. Sin embargo, esta modificación no representaría ninguna amenaza seria para el antirepresentacionalismo en la medida en que las consecuencias incómodas de su aceptación son en rigor propias de la concepción predictiva, y no de su combinación con aquél.

La segunda línea de argumentación antirepresentacionista apuntaría al hecho de que la idea misma de predicción presupone la adopción de una concepción representacional. Esta segunda línea de ataque al antirepresentacionalismo requiere de una argumentación independiente a favor de esta tesis subsidiaria. En el final de la presentación examinaré críticamente los posibles caminos que podrían recorrerse para defender esta nueva tesis.

Miércoles 24 de agosto

Keynote speaker #3 Liza Skidelsky



Universidad de Buenos Aires -

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas



¿Es el lenguaje un instrumento del pensamiento?

Varios representantes del enfoque biolingüístico han defendido, últimamente con mayor énfasis, la hipótesis de que el lenguaje es el instrumento del pensamiento (Chomsky 2015, Assulin 2016, Dupre 2020, entre otros). En este trabajo, analizaré esta hipótesis y mostraré los problemas que acarrea. Para ello, distinguiré, en primer lugar, siguiendo una caracterización de la tradición biolingüística, entre aquellos enfoques que consideran que el instrumento del pensamiento sería la lengua-E (lenguas públicas) de aquellos que consideran que serían los productos de la lengua-I (mecanismo cognitivo). En la segunda parte, presentaré, al menos, tres opciones para entender qué quiere decir que la lengua-I sea el “instrumento” del pensamiento: en tanto que sirve para la expresión del pensamiento, en tanto vehículo del pensamiento, y en tanto idéntica al pensamiento. Intentaré mostrar las dificultades que surgen para dar sentido a la idea de que las representaciones lingüísticas producto de la lengua I constituyen el instrumento del pensamiento en cualquiera de estas acepciones.

Jueves 25 de agosto

Jueves 25 de agosto

Keynote speaker #4 Andrés Páez



Universidad de los Andes, Colombia



Idealization and non-factive understanding in machine learning

Proxy or surrogate models are used in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) to provide some degree of understanding of opaque machine learning systems. In this talk I explore the nature of these models. In particular, I inquire whether they are akin to the idealizations used in science to understand complex phenomena. I argue that although proxy models differ in significant ways from idealizations, they cannot be understood in factive or quasi-factive terms either. The peculiar nature of proxy models, and the epistemic role they play, provide an argument in support of three different but interconnected theses. First, I argue that proxy models show that (i) non-factive understanding is a legitimate and unavoidable form of understanding. This view is closely tied to (ii) the idea that many models are epistemic tools that transcend their representational nature. Proxy models present a vivid example of that pragmatic thesis. Finally, I argue that (iii) proxy models provide objectual understanding of the target system, and that the understanding they provide cannot be reduced to a functional kind of understanding based only on inputs and outputs.

Consider the following desiderata: the objects an experience is about making a difference to individuating the experience and giving its veridicality conditions, and experiences of different objects (or of no objects at all) can possibly share the same phenomenal character. The first desideratum motivated object-involving theories of content, whereas the second one led to generalist views. Object-involving theories typically have content singularity encompassing phenomenal particularity, but this move renders phenomenal sameness mysterious. Generalist views, on the other hand, simply deny the very existence of phenomenal particularity as something over and above general properties. I argue, on the contrary, that phenomenal particularity is a legitimate phenomenological datum and that content singularity does a poor job explaining it.

Here is, in a few bullets, my own take on this issue: (1) The phenomenological sense in which an experience is particular and the metaphysical/semantic sense in which an experience is about a particular object need not be conflated and need not be in conflict. What is needed is a layered conception of content

Jueves 25 de agosto

Marco Aurelio Alves Sosa 

Federal University of São João del-Rei 

Hallucination and perceptual content

Perceptual (visual) experiences typically portray scenes in which ordinary objects are presented to us as discrete and numerically distinct individuals. A mental state instantiates phenomenal particularity if particularity falls within the scope of how things seem to the subject. The crucial – and often overlooked – the point here is that we not only perceive particular objects, but we perceive them as particular objects.

Consider the following desiderata: the objects an experience is about making a difference to individuating the experience and giving its veridicality conditions, and experiences of different objects (or of no objects at all) can possibly share the same phenomenal character. The first desideratum motivated object-involving theories of content, whereas the second one led to generalist views. Object-involving theories typically have content singularity encompassing phenomenal particularity, but this move renders phenomenal sameness mysterious. Generalist views, on the other hand, simply deny the very existence of phenomenal particularity as something over and above general properties. I argue, on the contrary, that phenomenal particularity is a legitimate phenomenological datum and that content singularity does a poor job explaining it.


Here is, in a few bullets, my own take on this issue: (1) The phenomenological sense in which an experience is particular and the metaphysical/semantic sense in which an experience is about a particular object need not be conflated and need not be in conflict. What is needed is a layered conception of content that does not load the entire explanatory job on a single notion. (2) Perceptual experiences single out objects in the environment and make reference to them. Perceptual singling out, akin to the Kaplanian character, can be understood as functions mapping objects in the environment into the content of the experience. This function purports to pick out an object as its value, but independently of its referential success, it can fix the singular look of our experiences. (3) The function, together with a property cluster, compose what I call a content-schema. Content-schema is importantly less than content: by itself, it cannot determine the veridicality conditions of a token experience. (4)




However, there are two kinds of satisfying conditions: the first one captures the requirements for being properly related to the perceived objects (if any), whereas the second one determines whether or not a particular experiential episode is veridical. (4)

Failing to satisfy the first condition amounts to a referential failure that renders the experience empty. An empty experience—or a hallucination—is a peculiar way in which perception can go wrong. Though a hallucination represents no specific state of affairs, its content-schema puts some constraints on what is needed to have a successful experience. Content-schema plays some of the roles typically attributed to content: it adds a layer that goes alongside the classical notion of content and that is perfectly suited for explaining the phenomenology of experience. (6) To conclude, I argue that my proposal offers an original and promising way out of many of the enigmas that haunt the contemporary philosophy of perception.

Jueves 25 de agosto

Carlos Muñoz-Suárez 

Universidad Icesi 

Altercentric cognitive influence and the structure of thought experiments

Running thought experiments is a traditional method in philosophy and science. I will introduce a new model of the structure and dynamics of thought experiments on the basis of considerations about intersubjective coordinations between experimenters and experimental subjects. The model describes a hierarchy of experimental design and intersubjective interaction set up to set off certain changes in cognitive processing (also called, altercentric influences). The model promotes the view that thought experiments have methodological value because they are sui generis ways of influencing others' cognitive processing to access unconsidered alternatives with respect to a target domain of knowledge. In particular, thought experiments are modeled as controlled dialectical procedures that involve a hierarchy with different layers of experimenter's expectations (ranging from material to psychological and doxastic ones) and distinctive representational processes (like narrative encodings, fictional depictions and triggering of cognitive dispositions).

Contrary to the traditional individualistic view, according to the model, the experimental status of thought experiments is intersubjective and their methodological value derives from setting up conditions for accessing unconsidered alternatives through altercentric cognitive influences. The (cognitive) outcomes of such experimental influences are described as post-experimental, such that the procedure itself gets a well fit with a pluralistic account of the diversity in cognitive outcomes (e.g. judgments) that are elicited by them. In a nutshell, thought experiments are intersubjective exploratory procedures for generating altercentric cognitive influences.

In negative terms, the model is aimed to explained why thought experiments are hard to replicate and, therefore, why their methodological value does not rely on the reliability-by-replicability of their results. If the model works well, by analogy to exploratory experimental procedures in natural sciences, the methodological value of thought experiments relies on their experimental value, which is described as independent from the reliability –or truth-tracking status– of the cognitive responses that they elicit; that amounts to say that their value, as experimental procedures, doesn't depend on the empirical adequacy or truth of their (cognitive) outcomes. As a consequence, the debate between thought experimental philosophy (also called armchair philosophy) and experimental philosophy could be seen as orthogonal to the development of an account of the methodological value and experimental status of thought experiments.

Jueves 25 de agosto

Mauro Zapata



Universidad Nacional de Córdoba



Animal timing

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Jueves 25 de agosto

Victoria Lavoreiro



Universidad de la República del Uruguay



Paridad cognitiva, desdén epistémico y polarización afectiva: los peligros de desacordar profundamente

¿Es posible estar en desacuerdo con alguien sin considerarlo cognitivamente defectuoso? La respuesta parece ser un sí rotundo: estar en desacuerdo con alguien no implica pensar menos de él. Que alguien tenga una opinión equivocada desde nuestro punto de vista, no significa que sea tonto, malintencionado o incapaz de razonar. Cuando asumimos que nuestro interlocutor es más o menos igualmente capaz (o incapaz) en sus habilidades cognitivas como nosotros, lo consideramos nuestro par cognitivo. Parece claro, entonces, que dos personas con puntos de vista contrapuestos sobre un tema pueden tener juicios positivos, o al menos neutrales, sobre el carácter epistémico del otro, es decir considerarse entre sí como pares cognitivos.

Pero por más intuitiva que es esta suposición, existe una clase de desacuerdo que puede desafiarla: los desacuerdos profundos. Un desacuerdo es profundo cuando las partes desacuerdan sobre muchas cuestiones interrelacionadas, incluida la forma de resolver el desacuerdo: cuales estándares epistémicos deben ser usados, qué cuenta como evidencia, qué principios epistémicos se deben seguir, etc. Como las partes desacuerdan sobre varios puntos, los desacuerdos profundos a menudo persisten por mucho tiempo. Los desacuerdos profundos no son raros; podemos encontrarlos en las redes sociales, eventos académicos o cenas familiares.

Es perfectamente concebible que las partes de un desacuerdo profundo tengan juicios neutrales o incluso favorables sobre el carácter epistémico de su contraparte. El desdén epistémico no es una característica definitoria de los desacuerdos profundos. Por desdén epistémico, llamo al juicio negativo que una parte tiene del carácter epistémico de la otra. Sin embargo, cuando analizamos casos reales de desacuerdos profundos, a menudo encontramos que las partes se insultan, realizan comentarios ad hominem y se acusan de vicios epistémicos o morales. En otras palabras, el desdén epistémico es un acompañante frecuente de los desacuerdos profundos.



En este artículo, analizo porqué la profundidad de un desacuerdo conduce al desdén epistémico, socavando así la posibilidad de una atribución de paridad cognitiva. Brevemente, las partes de un desacuerdo profundo pueden verse entre sí como pares cognitivos en las primeras instancias de su debate. Esto se debe a que las partes pueden suponer que las creencias contrarias de su contraparte se deben a la falta de información. Sin embargo, cuando comienzan a discutir, pronto se dan cuenta de que su interlocutor no cambia su posición a pesar de los argumentos convincentes y la evidencia que le presenta. Estas brechas en la racionalidad demandan un diagnóstico que muchas veces viene en forma de atribución de vicios epistémicos y/o morales. Así, el intercambio argumentativo fallido conspira contra la atribución inicial de paridad cognitiva, que a menudo es reemplazada por desdén epistémico.

Este desdén epistémico, argumento, tiende al aumento de la polarización afectiva; es decir, el aumento de sentimientos negativos que una población tiene por un grupo ajeno y asociaciones positivas con los miembros del grupo con el que se identifica. La polarización afectiva haría aún más improbable pensar al otro como un par cognitivo, lo cual aleja aún más la posibilidad de resolución del desacuerdo.

Jueves 25 de agosto

Miguel Ángel Sebastián



Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas -
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México



Perspectival information and the knowledge argument

Consciousness has proved to be a unique challenge for our understanding of the world. There seems to be an explanatory gap between phenomenal truths and truths regarding the fundamental constitution of the world; a constitution that science in our days prevalently assumes to be physical. Two of the most popular thought experiments in the history of philosophy are responsible for such an idea: Nagel's bat (1974) and Jackson's Mary (1982).

The phenomenal character or phenomenology of an experience is what it is like for the subject to have the experience. The problem of explaining consciousness is the problem of explaining what it takes for a state to have phenomenology. This problem divides into two: the fine-grained problem of explaining what it takes for a state to have one phenomenology rather than another, and the coarse-grained problem of explaining what it takes to have phenomenology at all. Jackson's knowledge argument suggests that the first question is more fundamental. The problem of explaining consciousness derives from the qualities that characterize differences in phenomenology among experiences: the redness of the experience one has when looking at a rose or the painfulness of the experience one has due to a tooth infection. On the other hand, Nagel's argument is naturally read as abstracting from the particular phenomenology and calling attention to the point of view or perspective inherent to any experience as the source of the problem.

I want to defend a Nagelian view, where the idea of a perspective is unpacked in semantic terms: the problem of consciousness is an informational one. The information that conscious experience provides cannot be deduced from an "objective" description of the world because its content is more fine-grained, a special kind of *de se* content that I will call perspectival. As a consequence, the knowledge argument tells us nothing regarding the truth of physicalism, and the intuition that Mary has substantial epistemic gain when experiencing red for the first time compatible with her knowing all the facts that obtain in her world.



The talk is organized as follows. In the first part, I present the relevant details of the knowledge argument, the problems for the physicalist that want to concede the intuition that the thought experiment proposes, and what seem to be the limits of the Jacksonian approach. I then introduce a widely accepted connection between information and phenomenology and offer a thought experiment to support the idea that phenomenal information is not mere information regarding qualities: the experience provides first-person or *de se* information. In the second part, based on recent debates regarding the nature of the *de se* phenomenon, I argue that phenomenal content is a special kind of *de se* content in that it is perspectival. I articulate in semantic terms what this exactly means, why this kind of content cannot be captured in objective terms, and how this accounts for what Mary learns. This explains why she cannot obtain such information from her books and monitors inside the room.

ALFAn

Jueves 25 de agosto

Keynote speaker #5 David Papineau



King's College London -
City University of New York Graduate Center



Knowledge norms are bad for us

Is knowledge a necessary requirement for assertion, belief and action? Many recent philosophers have argued that these “knowledge norms” have the backing of intuition. I shall show that, even so, these norms are often instrumentally counterproductive, and moreover that, even if knowledge is sometimes intrinsically valuable, it should generally take second place to other values in governing assertion, belief and action.